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Abstract
A central issue in the recent reforms of state pensions in Spain has been to increase the
proportionality between contributions and benefits along actuarially fair lines. The aim of this
paper is to quantify the transfer component of social security retirement pensions, with transfer
being understood as the difference between the pension effectively received and that which would
be received under a system of actuarial fairness. The analysis is placed within a life-cycle
framework, with particular reference to the distributive effects by income level. The results show
that, in the past, there was a marked bias in favour of the objective of intergenerational and
intragenerational redistribution, to the detriment of the objective of income insurance. This paper
examines the factors that determine the final value of the transfer component within the entire
Spanish pensions system.
JEL classification: D31, H55.
I. INTRODUCTION
Social security contributory pensions represent the main spending area within
the Spanish public sector. In the 1998 national budget, the provisions for
spending under this concept amounted to some 7,476,465 million pesetas and the
number of pensions has exceeded 7.5 million. Specifically, it is retirement
pensions that absorb the most important part of the budget, accounting for 67.8
per cent of it, followed by widows’/widowers’ pensions, with 18.5 per cent, and
invalidity pensions, with 12.1 per cent. In other words, more than 12 per cent of
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all disposable family income has its origin in social security contributory
pensions.
However, the expected problems with respect to the fiscal sustainability of
the pensions system have given rise to a series of reforms in Spain and in other
Mediterranean countries. Within these reforms, a key role has been given to the
criterion of proportionality between contributions and benefits. In a pay-as-you-
go scheme such as that found in Spain, which is somewhat removed from
actuarial fairness, the voters tend to consider the system in terms of a tax/transfer
model. As a result, the ‘generosity’ of the social security system is based not on
the logic of actuarial fairness, but on the weight that workers assign to old
people’s welfare in a hypothetical social welfare function. Having said that, the
instability caused by demographic transition undermines confidence in public
pensions, by reducing the expectations of return and increasing the opportunity
cost of the system, both in the present and, above all, in the future, compared
with other savings alternatives. The most foreseeable result is an
intergenerational conflict that erodes the weight that working generations
allocate to retired individuals’ welfare in the tax/transfer model, giving rise to
lower political support for the public system and a greater propensity towards
individual solutions (see Verbon (1987)).
The aim of this paper is to quantify the transfer component of social security
contributory retirement pensions, with transfer being understood as the
difference between the pension effectively received and that which would be
received under a system of actuarial fairness between contributions and benefits.
The large amount of the transfer component in Spanish pensions highlights the
fact that, in the past, there was a marked bias in favour of the objective of
redistribution, to the detriment of the objective of income insurance. However, in
the future, the predominance enjoyed by this objective of redistribution could
well undermine the political support that is given to the system.
Following the first studies on the life-cycle incidence of pensions, carried out
at the beginning of the 1970s, there have been a number of subsequent works,
from amongst which mention should particularly be made of Burkhauser and
Warlick (1981), Creedy (1982), Hurd and Shoven (1985), Meyer and Wolff
(1987), Boskin et al. (1987) and, more recently, Harding (1992), Creedy, Disney
and Whitehouse (1993), Falkingham, Hills and Lessof (1993), Wolff (1993) and
Nelissen (1994). For the case of Spain, Monasterio and Suárez (1992) and
Monasterio, Sánchez and Blanco (1996) have carried out studies into the
redistributive component and rate of return of the main social security regimes,
presenting results that highlight the importance of the break in the actuarial
equilibrium between contributions and pensions, as well as the quite exceptional
differences between these regimes. Nevertheless, given the information
available, both works are limited to a regime-by-regime comparison, without
providing a breakdown of the transfers according to income level and thus
making it impossible to calculate the redistributive capacity of the pensions.Transfers in Spanish State Retirement Pensions
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Another interesting study of the Spanish case is that of Medel, Molina and
Sánchez (1992), which quantifies the distributive effect of pensions and of other
social expenditure, albeit on an annual basis and not within the framework of
life-cycle incidence. Finally, Durán (1995) and Gil and López-Casasnovas
(1997) have employed simulations of the contributory trajectory of different
individuals, rather than historical data.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section II, we present a
summary of the Spanish social security system. Section III is given over to an
explanation of the methodology employed in the empirical work, with the results
being set out in Section IV. Section V closes the paper with a review of the most
important conclusions.
II. THE PUBLIC PENSIONS SYSTEM IN SPAIN
In Spain, the public pensions system is made up of two tiers. The first has a
contributory nature and operates on a pay-as-you-go basis. The second is non-
contributory and is available to those individuals who do not meet the
requirements of the first, always provided that their income does not exceed a
determined amount. The contributory system is structured as follows: a general
regime, which covers workers in the industrial and service sectors; six special
regimes, corresponding to the self-employed, farmers, farm workers, coal-
miners, seamen and domestic help; and, finally, a special regime covering
accidents at work and work-related illnesses. In turn, pensions are divided into
the following classes: retirement, permanent invalidity, widows/widowers,
orphans and other surviving dependants of deceased workers. Civil servants have
a special regime outside social security.
This work is centred on the impact of the life-cycle social security
contributory retirement pensions that fall under the general, the self-employed,
TABLE 1






Farm workers 11,307 6.24
Farmers 21,422 11.82
Domestic help 3,935 2.17
Total, five regimes 164,007 90.52
Other regimes 17,175 9.48
Total 181,182 100
Source: Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social, Memoria Estadística Anual 1992.Fiscal Studies
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the farm workers, the farmers and the domestic help regimes. When taken
together, these regimes, as at 31 December 1992, which is the reference point of
our research, covered some 86.8 per cent of all contributory retirement pensions
and 90.5 per cent of expenditure (see Table 1); thus it can be said that the results
obtained are truly representative of the global situation of the system.
In order to have access to a retirement pension, it is necessary, in general, to
meet the following requirements: to be registered with social security, to have
reached the age of 65 and to have made contributions for a minimum period of
15 years. The most relevant exception concerns the second of these, where
workers who were affiliated at 1 January 1967 can retire at 60.
According to the pension rules in force and effect in 1992 — that is to say,
applicable to the data being used in this study (these rules, dating from 1985,
were modified in July 1997) — the amount of the initial pension is a function of
a relevant income measure (the average contribution base of the eight years prior
to retirement), the number of years of contribution and the age at retirement.
This initial pension, IP, is obtained by applying the legal formula  λθ RB IP = .
That is to say, the initial pension is the product of the average regulatory base,
RB, multiplied by a percentage, λ , which is a function of the number of
contributing years, with a minimum of 60 per cent for 15 years (starting from the
date when the 1985 reform came into complete force and effect; 50 per cent for
10 years prior to that reform), plus 2 percentage points for each additional year,
up to a maximum of 100 per cent for 35 years of contribution. Further, if the
retirement age was less than 65, then the above result is reduced in accordance
with a correcting coefficient, θ , the value of which moves from 0.92 when
retirement takes place at 64, to 0.60 when it takes place at 60, with reductions of
0.08 points per year.
The system also provides for a guaranteed pension for those individuals who,
although having completed the required contribution period, nevertheless only
have a right to a very low pension by virtue of their meagre contributions, and
whose income does not exceed an annual limit. Once the amount of the initial
pension has been calculated, it is the subject of periodical revaluation at the
beginning of every year according to the anticipated rise in the consumer price
index, with a limit on the maximum pension (284,198 pesetas per month in
1997).
Reform in 1997 began the phasing-in of an extension to the period that is
taken as the base for the calculation of the regulatory base, RB, from eight to 15
years. The reform also changed the coefficient λ , with the objective of bringing
pensions more into line with contributions. The political parties have stated in
their programmes that their objective is to continue this line in order to guarantee
the future of the pensions system. Having said that, a number of significant
reforms have yet to be implemented. Nor is it foreseen that the different regimesTransfers in Spanish State Retirement Pensions
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will be merged. We can only say that, since the end of the 1970s, many of the
special regimes have gradually disappeared and that one can only assume that
this tendency will continue in the future, although there is currently no specific
project along these lines.
III. METHODOLOGY
The fundamental objective of this work is to quantify the transfer component
that exists in the pensions effectively received by those individuals who are
currently retired, to which end we have followed the model proposed by
Burkhauser and Warlick (1981), further developed by Meyer and Wolff (1987).
The said component is measured by the difference between the real pension and
that which would correspond to a system that respects the actuarial equilibrium
between the capitalised total of the contributions and the discounted and
expected value of the pensions.
Valuing both income streams in the year in which retirement takes place, R
(equal to the number of years of contribution), the total contributions of one
individual  would be the cumulated sum of contributions revalued at some
implicit interest rate. Denote this CR.  In turn, the discounted value of the
pensions received by current retirement pensioners between the moment of
retirement, R, and their death, and valued in R, is derived from the pension level
each year times the probability of surviving to that year. Denote this HR.
Let Pj be the value of the pension derived from applying the calculation and
uprating rules of the system that is in force in year j, which will normally differ
from the actuarial value that would correspond to it according to the equality HR
= CR. If we call this latter PA, we can compare the pension actually received in
year j (Pj) with that which would correspond to it according to the actuarial
fairness between contributions and benefits (PA). The difference Pj – PA has to be
interpreted, therefore, as the transfer component of the pensions programme in
year j:
T = Pj – PA.
The basic information needed for the required calculations has been supplied
directly by the Directorate General for Economic Planning at the Department of
Social Security. For each regime, we have a matrix made up of three variables:
the age of retirement (before or after the age of 65), the banded number of years
of contribution (in six intervals), and whether or not a minimum pension is
received. Thus we initially have 24 cells in each regime matrix, where each cell
provides the number of pensions and the average contribution base. This is the
best information upon which we can count, because it has not been possible toFiscal Studies
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gain access to the micro-data representative of a sample of pensioners, including
a complete history of their contribution record and pensions received to date.
However, the sizes of the considered cells are very different. As a
consequence, and as a general rule, we have proceeded to divide the cells that,
under each regime, exceed 10 per cent of total pensions. We have done this in
order to rely on more precise information concerning the regulatory bases of the
subgroups that, although having similar characteristics with respect to the length
of their contribution record, the age of retirement and whether or not a minimum
pension is received, nevertheless have very different contribution bases. The
contribution bases vary because, in each cell, we have individuals who retired in
different years and who have different contribution bases within each year. The
methods are described in more detail in the Appendix.
IV. RESULTS
A review of the results obtained for each regime studied shows, first, the high
transfer component that, as a general rule, has been enjoyed by all social security
retirement pensioners and which, at December 1992, represented some 49.4 per
cent of the total amount of the average retirement pension (Table 2). This
amount corresponds, therefore, to an intergenerational transfer from employed
workers to current pensioners, and its most immediate explanation lies in the
maturing process of the system itself. The limited length of the contribution
periods and the reduced quantity of the bases, which would have given rise to
very low pensions under actuarial equilibrium, have been compensated for by the
system through revaluations and through additions to bring pensions up to the
minimum pension level, with the financing of these being made possible thanks
to the high rates of growth enjoyed by the overall productivity of the economy
and to a demographic pyramid which has allowed a high degree of generosity to
be shown to pensioners. Our analysis has referred to all retirement pensions that
existed in Spain as at 31 December 1992, without the data allowing us to
determine the population cohorts to which the pensioners belonged. In any event,
it should be noted that, with the passage of time, the conditions for access to the
initial pension have been made more stringent, whilst the revaluations have been
lower. The overall effect of these changes has been to favour those pensioners
who joined the system at an earlier date. By contrast, the maturing of the system
has reduced the transfer percentages for newer pensioners.
Second, there is a marked disproportion in the transfer components received
under the different regimes. Whilst in the general regime the transfer component
is calculated to be 37.1 per cent, in the domestic help regime it reaches some
89.0 per cent, with high figures also being found in the farm workers, the farmers
and the self-employed regimes. The breakdown of the transfer component also
shows that the differences between the regimes are easy to detect in the initial
pension itself and in the additions for minimum pensions. Note that in theTransfers in Spanish State Retirement Pensions
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farmers, the farm workers and the domestic help regimes, the transfer in initial
pensions lies between 21 and 28 per cent, and that the domestic help regime has
an addition for minimum pension of close to 45 per cent.
Third, the transfer component has been calculated from an individual
perspective, ignoring the possibility that current pensioners could generate
survivors’ pensions (mostly widows’/widowers’ pensions). The available
information does not allow a distinction to be drawn between single individuals
and couples, but it can be confirmed that the inclusion of survivors’ pensions
will increase the transfer percentage by an amount equivalent to the discounted
value of all survivors’ pensions.
Grouping all the regimes together and presenting the results by contribution
decile offers more information on the distribution of the transfer component.
Again, we take as a reference the capitalised value of the contributions,
calculated as the discounted amount of the initial neutral pension.
The distributive pattern of the transfer component across contribution deciles
is clearly progressive, as can easily be seen from Table 3. In summary, the
pensions system pays relatively more to those who have contributed less,
completely breaking the principle of proportionality between contributions and
benefits which inspires it.
It would appear at first sight that the objectives of income redistribution
might explain this result, as evidenced by the lower revaluation bands for higher
deciles and the additions for minimum pensions that were proposed. If
contributions had always been the same proportion of the corresponding income
levels, then this would indeed have been the case. However, the contribution
bases have not been a good indicator of real incomes, and nor have the
contribution rates been uniform for equal bases. In the self-employed regime, the
contribution bases have been a pale reflection of incomes, especially when the
TABLE 2















General 62.90 4.24 28.68 4.18 37.10
Self-employed 41.05 6.64 29.25 23.06 58.95
Farm workers 20.30 27.48 39.66 12.55 79.70
Farmers 16.90 27.10 35.20 20.80 83.10
Domestic help 11.05 21.75 22.23 44.97 88.95
Total 50.62 9.45 30.17 9.76 49.38Fiscal Studies
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aspect of choice and manipulation of the bases has facilitated, until quite
recently, the phenomenon known as the ‘purchase of pensions’.
1 Additionally,
the contribution rates have been systematically lower under the special regimes
— as can be confirmed by the average values given in Table 2 — and in certain
categories of employment. In the light of this, the true progressivity of the
transfer component of pensions is not well illustrated by comparing it with
accumulated contributions. By contrast, it can be said that the rates of return
achieved in relation to the contributed amounts, and the possibilities for
exercising discretion in the choice of bases, have converted the social security
self-employed regime into an alternative investment that is without rival.
The results obtained so far have been based on a nominal discount rate of 6.5
per cent, equivalent to a real interest rate of 3 per cent and an expected inflation
rate of 3.4 per cent per year. A change in the discount rate will affect the transfer
component of pensions and have a small effect on the progressive nature of the
system.
On the one hand, an increase (decrease) in the discount rate applied will
reduce (increase) the uprated value of future pensions, in such a way that the
                                                                                                                                   
1This phenomenon occurred in the self-employed, farmers and domestic help regimes and consisted of
individuals either beginning to contribute or raising their contributions during the last years of their working
lives, in order to obtain greater eventual benefits. The introduction of non-contributory pensions as from 1991
and a greater rigour in the application of administrative controls have reduced the profitability of this practice.
TABLE 3
















1 4.07 7.07 44.91 43.96 95.93
2 12.00 16.63 40.33 31.04 88.00
3 26.13 22.19 31.76 19.92 73.87
4 32.33 18.33 26.02 23.32 67.67
5 47.58 22.35 25.87 4.19 52.42
6 48.63 7.58 31.25 12.53 51.37
7 58.38 –0.29 38.32 3.59 41.62
8 56.20 3.13 40.28 0.40 43.80
9 59.01 5.48 35.51 0.00 40.99
10 80.29 7.90 11.81 0.00 19.71
Total 50.61 9.46 30.17 9.76 49.39
aThe ranking is carried out in accordance with the amount of the contribution.Transfers in Spanish State Retirement Pensions
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transfer component falls (increases) in all the regimes and in all the contribution
deciles. With a discount rate of 6.5 per cent, the total transfer component for the
whole system is 49.4 per cent of the pension received, whilst with a discount rate
of 5 per cent, this component increases to 54.7 per cent, and with a rate of 7.5
per cent, it falls to 45.8 per cent. On the other hand, the effect of a change in the
discount rate is not equal in all regimes or in all contribution deciles. Although
in all cases the uprated value of future pensions changes by the same proportion,
the introduction of different assumptions over the discount rate causes a slight
change to the progressive nature of the system, making it more progressive the
higher is the discount rate applied.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this paper has been to calculate the redistributive effect of
social security retirement pensions in Spain, by comparing the monthly amount
of pension effectively received and the amount that would correspond to an
actuarial equilibrium between contributions and benefits. The results obtained
allow us to draw the following conclusions.
First, the Spanish social security system is paying out pensions that
significantly exceed the amount that is actuarially fair. In total, some 49.4 per
cent of expenditure on retirement pensions could be interpreted as an
intergenerational transfer from the currently employed to current pensioners.
Second, the combination of different calculation rules for the initial pension,
for revaluation procedures and for additions for minimum pensions implies a
different redistributive effect in each pension regime. The most favoured regimes
are those covering domestic help, farmers and farm workers, with transfer
percentages of between 80 and 90 per cent of the value of the pension received.
By contrast, under the general regime, which corresponds to employees in the
industrial and service sectors, the transfer percentage is 37 per cent, explained in
great part by the revaluations accumulated in the past.
Third, the results must be interpreted as the minimum value of the transfer
component. We say this for two reasons: first, because we have assumed
complete transfer to the employees of the employers’ contributions, so that all
contributions are assigned to the financing of pensions, without taking into
account other benefits, such as sickness or maternity benefits; and, second,
because we have not included in our analysis possible survivors’ pensions, which
would also increase the transfer percentage.
The final conclusion is that the pensions system in Spain has operated more
as a mechanism for the redistribution of income than as income insurance for old
age. The maturing of the system itself, together with the reforms introduced in
1997, is altering the proportion of the actuarial and redistributive elements of the
system, increasing the former and reducing the latter. However, it should be
noted that the effects of the reforms will be moderate, given that they only affectFiscal Studies
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new pensioners who, in 1997, represented some 6.6 per cent of the total.
Furthermore, these reforms are being introduced in a phased process and will
only be fully in effect after 2002. For these reasons, the 1997 law will not be
sufficient and the political agenda contains a number of proposals that will
probably give more weight to income insurance.
In summary, the break with proportionality that can be detected in the social
security pensions system in Spain has arisen, as a general rule, in response to
initially redistributive patterns — namely, the progressive revaluation of
pensions and the additions for pensions that do not reach minimum values.
Having said that, the imperfections that are abundant within the system have
distanced it from this general rule, and it is difficult to justify certain types of
transfer that favour those pensioners who are situated in high income strata. Any
proposed reform to the pensions system must therefore take into account the
redistributive elements of both the current system and its alternatives.
In terms of the reforms that must be undertaken in order to respond to the
phenomenon of an ageing population, and given that the main reason for
foreseeing a reduction in the political support given to the public system is that it
is viewed as a tax/transfer mechanism, any correcting measures must be directed
towards the actuarial mechanisms of the system, increasing the proportionality
between contributions and benefits and reducing the transfer component. It is our
belief that greater proportionality will result in higher political support from the
workers, reducing the risk of a migration from collective towards individual
solutions and restoring part of the confidence that was lost during the
demographic transition.
APPENDIX. CALCULATING THE TRANSFER COMPONENT OF THE
SPANISH PENSION PROGRAMME: DETAILED METHODOLOGY
The basic information needed for the required calculations has been supplied
directly by the Directorate General for Economic Planning at the Department of
Social Security, as described in Section III. In order to subdivide each of the
large cells, as described also in Section III, we have assumed that the individual
contribution bases follow a log-normal distribution, which is most generally
employed in similar studies and which adapts best to the Spanish situation
(Jiménez et al., 1994). The total dispersion within those cells has two
components, one arising from dispersion across pensioners within years and one
arising from dispersion across years. The information employed to estimate these
variances is provided by the data in Jiménez et al. (1994) on the distribution of
the total amount of retirement pensions by pension decile in each social security
regime, and by the Annual Statistical Report of the National Social Security
Institute for 1992 with reference to the distribution by monetary bands of the
number of pensions in force and effect. From the first of these sources, we have
obtained the average amount of the total pension for each pension decile for allTransfers in Spanish State Retirement Pensions
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the regimes (see Table A.1) and, by matching these with the data from the
second source, we have obtained the location of those pensions that receive
additions, by way of a simple comparison between the legally established
minimum pension and the pension bands included in each decile.
In order to calculate the transfer components, T, we need to be able to
calculate the total contributions of any one individual, CR, and the discounted
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where Bj is the contribution base in year j, tj is the sum of the contribution rates
charged to the employer and the worker, and ri is the rate of return applied each
year to the contributions in accordance with a specific selected interest rate. We
include the contribution paid by the employer because we assume the complete
transfer to the employee of the employer’s contribution, so that all contributions
are assigned to the financing of pensions — a hypothesis that is quite common in
the literature and which is not rejected by the Spanish case, as has been
demonstrated by Argimón and González-Páramo (1987). It is important to note
that equation (1) corresponds to a purely hypothetical concept (Wolff, 1993),
given that the social security pensions system is constructed on a ‘pay-as-you-go’
basis, so that contributions do not give rise to the formation of reserves.
Second,
TABLE A.1










1 31,347 23,946 31,543 26,766 16,826
2 45,109 33,155 43,014 38,562 32,011
3 47,403 44,668 44,925 44,913 44,733
4 53,520 45,128 44,925 44,913 45,144
5 58,872 45,128 45,881 44,913 45,144
6 71,105 45,128 51,138 45,367 45,144
7 83,338 46,049 53,050 48,542 45,144
8 102,452 52,956 53,050 52,172 45,144
9 120,037 52,956 53,050 53,079 45,144

















where qj is the survival probability in year j, Pj is the amount of the pension
corresponding to year j, and r is the rate of discount applied to future benefits.
To calculate the capitalised value of the contributions, we have used the
average rate of cumulative annual growth of the average contribution bases for
general contingencies, δω , for each one of the regimes studied, taking the years
between 1967 and 1992 as the reference time period. As a result, the contribution
base of one specific year can be linked with the base of the first year of
contribution, B1:  Bj = B1
1 ) 1 ( − + j δω . The contribution rate is also calculated
taking the average value, t , for each regime in the identical period.
Furthermore, the interest rate employed in order to capitalise the social
contributions has been the internal return of private bonds for ordinary investors,
as a proxy for the return that the contributors would have obtained from a long-
term, non-risk-bearing asset. Although long-term public debt would be better
than private bonds, the non-existence of a sufficiently long series has prevented
us from adopting this as a reference for the rate of interest. We have calculated
an average rate for the period 1967–92, obtaining a value of 13.3 per cent.
In summary, the contribution rate, tj, and the interest rate, rj, in expression (1)
can also be substituted by their average values, t  and r , respectively. As a
consequence, expression (1) becomes
(3) ∑
=




R r t B C
1
1
1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( δω .
The discounted value of the benefits, which is reflected in expression (2), can be
broken down into three concepts which make up the total amount of a pension —
that is to say, the initial pension (IP), accumulated revaluations from the moment
of retirement up to year j (Zk), and the addition for minimum pension in year j
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As an initial supposition, we assume that both the accumulated revaluations and
the additions for minimum pensions are an integral part of the transfer
component, because in no case will they form part of a funded pensions system.
As a consequence, for the moment, we will disregard Zk and Mj in expression (4),
in order to limit ourselves to the discounted value of a constant pension equal to
the initial pension. This initial pension is obtained by applying the legal formula
λθ RB IP =  described in Section II.



























) 1 ( ) 1 (
λθ
.
The average retirement age of those under 65 has been calculated in each one
of the regimes on the basis of data from the Ministry of Work and Social
Security (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, 1993). The interest rate to
be applied in order to discount the pensions is a fixed nominal rate of 6.5 per
cent, which can be considered as equivalent to an interest rate of 3 per cent in
real terms with an expected average annual rate of inflation of 3.4 per cent.
Finally, the survival probabilities are taken from the Mortality Tables of the
Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE). These rates have been corrected
for the socio-economic differences in mortality estimated by Regidor et al. (1994
and 1996) for individuals aged between 60 and 64 belonging to three socio-
economic groups: manual workers, farmers, and management and professional.
Given that our first objective is to determine the transfer component of the
initial pension, TC
IP, we compare the capitalised value of the contributions made
(CR) and the discounted value of a pension that is constant and equal to the initial
one up to the death of its title holder,  IP
R H . This is the same as comparing
expressions (3) and (5).
We have then assigned to each pension decile — for which we know the
amounts of the initial and total pensions — the amounts that correspond to them
for accumulated revaluations and for additions for minimum pensions. Given
that, within each decile, we know which pensions equal the minimum and which
do not, the allocation of the expenditure on revaluations is immediate for those
pensions without additions — that is to say, as the simple difference between the
total and the initial pension. In the case of those pensions that do receive
additions, the procedure is more complicated and has taken into account the
revaluations policy applied to each regime during the last few years — policies
that have generally been very progressive.Fiscal Studies
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Finally, having determined the amounts of the initial pensions and of the
accumulated revaluations, the value of the additions for minimum pensions is
obtained simply as the difference between the sum of these amounts and the
average amount of the total pension. The result of all the above is that the total
pensions of the regimes studied can be broken down into four parts — namely,
the initial neutral pension, the transfer component in the initial pension, the
accumulated revaluations and the additions for minimum pensions, where the
total of the last three is the value of the transfer component of the pension
effectively received.
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